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     GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Traditional principles of Contract law are ebbing before a flood tide bearing a
more radicalised idea of the contract of employment.  Some may identify in this
innovation a reaction to the tradition of free market individualism   expressed in
the ideas of sanctity of contract, the search for agreement and the maxim caveat
emptor.   Parties to a contract  may now be prevented from the pursuit of their
selfish interests notwithstanding  express terms of a contract which ostensibly
appear to justify this.  Express agreement may yield to obligations which are
imposed by  law.  Amongst these significant developments is the importation of
a duty binding each party to the employment contract to act in good faith, (1) a
duty which appears to be very different from the long recognised duty of the
employee to serve faithfully.  (2)
At present the nature of this new duty appears to be illusive.  Nevertheless, its
importation poses difficult questions about  how far the re-alignment of the
employment relationship might extend.   The authorities appear to establish the
concept of  an actionable abuse of a contractual right notwithstanding the
relevant conduct ostensibly falls within the express power conferred.  But this
only poses complex questions.  Against what standard is such abuse to be
identified?  Is the good faith obligation merely a device to allow the court to
enforce the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract?   Is the proper
focus the  spirit rather than the letter of the bargain, thus departing from
orthodox canons of construction?  This note examines  some recent decisions
which have placed some reliance on the idea of good faith performance.
The Nature of Good Faith Performance
One recent application of the duty to act in good faith  restricts the operation of
contractual discretionary powers by identifying the fundamental purposes for
which power was conferred.  It confines the employer's decision-making so as
to uphold those purposes.   It may thus preclude reliance on the full scope of
contractually expressed discretionary powers where to do so would be to the
unreasonable detriment of the employee. This was so in the recent decision in
Clark v. BET plc (3)    where the issue concerned the quantum of damages to be
awarded in an action for wrongful dismissal.  Here, by his contract, a company
chief executive had a right to have his salary reviewed annually and "increased
by such amount if any as the board shall in its absolute discretion decide."
2(emphasis supplied)  The contract further stated that in reaching its decision
the board had to "consider"  the remuneration policy of other companies.  The
director claimed that he was entitled (inter alia) to damages including the salary
increases of 10.5% he would have received during his notice period.
According to orthodox contractual principles,  it would have been open to the
court to decide that the board enjoyed an absolute discretion limited only by the
duty to "consider" other companies' practices. It might therefore have fulfilled
its contract merely by directing its mind to those other pay awards, and their
surrounding circumstances,  and resolved to award no pay increase (since a
duty "to consider" is a different matter from a duty to "adopt").  It would
certainly have been under no obligation to exercise the express discretion to
award a pay rise since the clause as drafted  appeared to contemplate the
possibility that no increase might be awarded.    However, Timothy Walker J.
held that under the express terms of the contract the director had a right to
receive an annual increase in his salary; only the amount (if any) lay in the
discretion of the board.  The judgment continued to refine this by super-
imposing duties which would not be unfamiliar to the Administrative lawyer.
The board appeared to have an implied duty  to exercise  its discretion honestly
and in accordance  with objective principles, including the contractually
relevant consideration of the pay structures of other companies and the
profitability of BET.     Controversially  his lordship added:
"..if the board had capriciously or in bad faith exercised its discretion so as to
determine the increase at nil....that would have been a breach of contract."  (4)
Subsequently, he  stated that:
"Nor should I assume that any discretion would have been exercised so as to
give the least possible benefit to the plaintiff if such an assumption would on
the facts have been realistic." (5)
 The court  eventually ventured into the controversial arena of wage setting by
determining the actual pay increase the director might have received but for his
dismissal. (6)
Good faith performance in  Clark was evidently deployed to control the broad
discretion  the board exercised under the express terms of the contract.   (7)
3The obligation to perform in good faith precluded contractual performance  in
the manner most favourable to the employer where this  prejudiced the
employee notwithstanding that the contract ex facie might have justified this.
Performance according to the  letter  of the contract could thus constitute a
breach of it.  It seems therefore that  good faith performance is  not exclusively
concerned with the construction of the express words of the bargain.  The
question must then be asked: what alternative, higher, standard prevails?
Two radically different possibilities are suggested.  The first is that  primacy is
given to  the contractual contemplation of the parties.  This might be  a
comparatively  uncontroversial innovation since by its search for presumed
intention it is merely a different expression of freedom and sanctity of contract.
However, as attractive as this limited development may be to some, the courts
may find themselves inevitably drawn towards a very different and more
objective standard.  (8)   This would be so because of the evidential difficulty
which must be encountered in searching for the presumed intention of the
parties at the time of contract.    The absence of clear evidence on this issue
would invite the court to substitute some judicially identified idea of
reasonableness for any presumed agreement thereby exposing the fiction of the
search for agreement.  (9)    Similarly,  who is to say  that parties with divergent
interests share a common expectation as to the future exercise of contractual
discretionary powers?
If this analysis is correct, the smuggling of some perception of good industrial
practice into the contract of employment under the shadowy cloak of good faith
may  become an inevitable  response to the uncertain and almost inevitable
fiction of contractual expectation.  This development towards  juridifying
standards of good industrial practice has already been presaged by the range of
conduct which has been held capable of  breaching the contract of employment.
(10)  Good faith may accelerate this growth and generate a new commitment to
industrial justice.
Good Faith and Trust and Confidence
Some decisions are expressly founded on a duty to perform in good faith; (11)
in others  the duty is less distinctly articulated, and may appear to be
intertwined with the more familiar duty  binding each party to do nothing to
4destroy the mutual relationship of trust and confidence, which itself derives
from a change in legal culture. (12)    This was so in the recent case of  Adin v.
Sedco Forex International (13) where Lord Coulsfield in the Court of Session,
Outer House  formulated one of the issues in the case as follows: "whether the
general obligation, often referred to as the obligation of trust and confidence or
of good faith, .... was implied in this contract...." (emphasis supplied). (14)
Some decisions which rely on the  duty to maintain trust and confidence,
without express reference to a duty to perform in good faith, are nevertheless
consistent with the emerging duty.   Similarly,   decisions  which
controversially expand the duty to co-operate may also exemplify one aspect of
good faith performance.  This is particularly so where the breach comprises
conduct undertaken with an intention to injure the employer's business. (15)
Similarly, the failure of the employer to take reasonable steps to safeguard an
employee from harm threatened by third parties has recently been confirmed as
a breach of trust and confidence.  This duty is also consistent with the idea of
good faith performance, which can require one contacting party to have regard
to the interests of the other. (16)    Good faith may also require one contracting
party to allow the other to perform their part. It has now been held that a
repudiatory breach occurs where an employee who has received a  warning on
capability grounds is given no support from the employer in endeavouring to
improve.  This is so because without support the opportunity to improve is
without value.  Hitherto tribunals have derived this result from the trust and
confidence principle; in other  jurisdictions it could be explained as an
application of the  doctrine of good faith performance. (17)     The ideological
foundation of many of these decisions establishes a  unitary model of
employment which identifies a common interest between employer and
employee in the success of the commercial venture, the achievement of which
depends upon mutual co-operation and support.  It is, however,  too early to
suggest that this model informs all aspects of the  employment relationship.
(18)   It will fall to future developments to identify how far the co-operative
model can extend.
Malik v. BCCI, (19) which is a decision of major importance endorsing and
extending the co-operative model, indicates that this process is already in train.
Here the House of Lords held that there is a duty binding the employer not to
conduct the business so as to destroy trust and confidence in a manner that
would inhibit the employee's future employment prospects.   Lord Nicholls
5emphasised that "..the purpose of the trust and confidence implied term is to
facilitate the proper functioning of the contract."  (20)   He continued, ".. the
purpose of the trust and confidence term is to preserve the employment
relationship and to enable that relationship to prosper and continue..." (21)  As
indicated below, these formulations illustrate the potential synergy between the
implied duties of trust and confidence and good faith.
 The facts were that Malik and another were employees of bank alleged to have
been corrupt and dishonest. Their employments were terminated by reason of
redundancy when the bank went into liquidation.   Neither employee was guilty
of any wrongdoing but, because their names were linked to such a business,
their good standing in the financial services sector was destroyed so that it had
not been possible for them to work in financial services since their dismissals.
They sought and obtained damages for  injury to reputation reflecting their loss
of earnings.
 The House of Lords held that if  the employer's conduct is a breach of the duty
to maintain trust and confidence which prejudicially affected an employee's
future employment prospects so as to give rise to continuing financial loss, and
it was reasonably foreseeable that such loss was a serious possibility, in
principle damages would be recoverable if injury to reputation (and so future
employment prospects) could be established in evidence as a consequence of
the breach.
Their lordships rejected the bank's submission that the employees were unaware
of the bank's wrongdoing during their employment and so the employees'
confidence in their employer  could not have been undermined.   This argument
postulated a subjective standard which their lordships held was inappropriate.
As Lord Nicholls observed:   "the objective standard provides the answer to the
(respondents) submission that unless the employee's confidence is actually
undermined there is no breach.  A breach occurs where the proscribed conduct
takes place: here, by operating a dishonest and corrupt business.  Proof of a
subjective loss of confidence is not an essential element of the breach.". (22)
Their lordships also rejected the submission that the dishonest conduct
complained of had to be aimed at the employees individually and not at third
party clients.
6This decision will allow claims for damages where it is  reasonably foreseeable
that employment prospects will be harmed (and are actually harmed) as a result
of the employer's breach of trust and confidence, even if the dismissal occurs
principally for other reasons (such as, in this case,  redundancy).  How many
cases will now arise depend on the developing scope of the implied term.
The Malik decision, although ostensibly founded on the duty to maintain trust
and confidence, might also be explicable in  terms of good faith performance.
This is especially so if good faith essentially requires minimum moral or ethical
standards in the manner in which the parties deal with each other. According to
this view obligations transcend the duty to perform a promise to    a broader
ethical conception of contractual behaviour.   (23)  Fundamentally, the decision
endorses the co-operative model of employment upon which the emerging
doctrine of good faith rests, and it significantly continues the process of
juridifying good industrial  standards.
The courts are involved in a profound experiment by importing the continental
doctrine of good faith performance.  Values other than that which requires
adherence to the  literal terms of a bargain inform many of the decisions
reached on the basis of good faith notwithstanding the value in upholding a
bargain freely struck.
Some commentators  will object that the courts are ill-suited to the task of
establishing standards of industrial justice by means of an expanded and
radicalised conception of the implied term.  Commercial certainty suffers where
agreement is overridden by broader notions of  good faith.   And there are
questions about how far this process can go.  Will the courts in effect re-write
contracts  to redistribute windfall benefits or unexpected burdens?  Will good
faith extend to negotiations?  How far will the employer have to have regard to
the interests of the employee?   Will modern employment theories which
emphasise team working and "ownership" of the business venture inform the
future shape of legal rights?   How far, in essence, will the courts abandon a
conflictual for a co-operative model of employment?   Good faith may prove to
be a  formidable challenge.
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